



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
BEAUMONT DIVISION**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**§**

**VS.**

**§**

**CASE NO. 1:15-CR-17(2)**

**ANGELA DUNAWAY**

**§**

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**§**

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE  
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(i) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that the defendant, Angela Dunaway, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Marcia A. Crone. The United States Probation Office filed its *Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* (doc. #170) requesting the revocation of the defendant's supervised release. The Court conducted a hearing on August 10, 2017, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. The defendant was present and represented by counsel at the hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that the defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants

the revocation of her supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

- a. That the defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.
- b. That the defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that her plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

#### **STATEMENT OF REASONS**

##### **A. Procedural History**

On November 12, 2015, Angela Dunaway was sentenced before The Honorable Marcia A. Crone of the Eastern District of Texas after pleading guilty to the offense of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, a Class C felony. Ms. Dunaway was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment followed by three (3) years supervised release, plus special conditions to include restitution, financial disclosure, no new credit, gambling prohibition, drug testing and treatment, and mental health treatment. On January 10, 2017, the Defendant completed her period of imprisonment and began service of the supervision term.

## **B. Allegations in Petition**

The United States Probation Office alleges that the defendant violated the following standard condition of release:

*The defendant shall report to the probation officer as directed by the Court or probation officer, and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month.*

Specifically, as of the writing of the petition, Ms. Dunaway had not yet submitted a supervision report for the month of June 2017, which was due no later than July 5, 2017.

## **C. Evidence presented at Hearing:**

At the hearing, the Government proffered evidence in support of the allegation in the petition to revoke. Specifically, the Government would establish that as part of her supervision, Ms. Dunaway was ordered to submit monthly reports to her probation officer within the first five days of each month. The evidence would show that Ms. Dunaway failed to submit a monthly report for June 2017 to her probation officer as directed.

Defendant, Angela Dunaway, offered a plea of true to the allegations. Specifically, she agreed with the evidence summarized above and pled true to the allegation that she failed to submit a monthly report in violation of her supervision conditions.

## **D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition**

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).* The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a standard condition of her supervised release by failing to submit a monthly report for the month of June 2017. This conduct constitutes a Grade C violation under

U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke the defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2).

Based upon the Defendant's criminal history category of VI and the Grade C violation, the sentencing guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from 8 to 14 months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two (2) years. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

If the Court revokes a defendant's term of supervision and orders the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment for that revocation, the Court may also require that the defendant be placed on a new term of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). The length of this term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense which resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release. *Id.* The statutory authorized term for supervised release in this case is not more than three (3) years.

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release<sup>1</sup>, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v.*

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<sup>1</sup> *See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

*Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id.* See also *United States v. Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and the defendant's own admission supports a finding that the defendant violated her supervision conditions. Ms. Dunaway pled true, agreed with the Court's recommended sentence for that violation, and waived her right to allocute before the District Court.

Accordingly, based upon the defendant's plea of true, the agreement of the parties, and the evidence presented in this case, it is the recommendation of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke Defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the District Court order Defendant to serve a term of **six (6) months** imprisonment, with a **new term of supervised release of two (2) years** to follow. This recommended sentence of imprisonment is slightly below the range suggested by the Guidelines, but the parties presented confidential information to the Court *in camera* which supports the lower prison term. The parties also agreed to this sentence.

The new term of supervision should be subject to the same mandatory and standard conditions adopted by the Court and imposed in the original judgment of conviction. The Court further finds that the special conditions stated in the judgment originally imposed by the District Court are still relevant based on the record of the case and the evidence submitted by the Probation Office in conjunction with the petition to revoke.

### **OBJECTIONS**

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party's failure to

object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v. Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 10th day of August, 2017.**



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KEITH F. GIBLIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE